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I V 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO CROSS-APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
L TOOELE ASSOCIATES PROPERLY ASSERTED ITS CLAIM FOR A 
REFUND OF ITS INSPECTION FEE. 
The City should not be allowed to keep any portion of an illegal tax. Tooele 
Associates has at all times asserted its claim for a return of at least a portion of its 
$94,508.24 inspection fee ("Inspection Fee") based on a determination that the Inspection 
Fee was an illegal tax. Specifically, Tooele Associates' fourth claim for relief asserted a 
claim for a refund of the portion of the Inspection Fee determined to be an illegal tax. 
Tooele Associates' fifth claim for relief sought a declaratory judgment that the City's 
civil inspection fee established by Resolution 96-39 ("Civil Inspection Fee") was as an 
illegal tax. Tooele Associates has not deviated from those claims at any time in this case. 
As pointed out by the City, Tooele Associates' fourth claim for relief was 
dismissed on the grounds that the inspections of Phase IE had not been completed and, 
therefore, the Trial Court could not determine whether the Inspection Fee exceeded the 
costs of the inspections. [R. at 00811-00810, Memorandum Decision]. However, it is 
Tooele Associates' position on appeal that, given the Trial Court's determination that the 
Civil Inspection Fee was an illegal tax, Tooele Associates is entitled to a return of its 
entire fee either under its fourth claim for relief or as supplemental relief under Tooele 
Associates' fifth claim for relief. The fact that the actual costs of the CitVs civil 
inspection services at issue have not been determined should not mean that the City gets 
to retain the Inspection Fee. The burden should be on the City to establish its actual costs 
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of the inspection of Phase IE to date or face the prospect of refunding the entire amount. 
In any event, an illegal tax should be refunded. 
With regard to the supplemental relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, it is 
true that the statutory provision could be read to require that a separate petition be filed 
following the adjudication of the declaratory judgment claim. See Utah Code Ann. 
§78B~6-406 (2009). However, such a requirement only makes sense in the situation 
where the claim for further relief has not been made part of the original suit. See Utah 
Restaurant Assoc, v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1162-1163 (Utah 
1985) (affirming district court's holding that the fee regulation was invalid and that the 
restaurant plaintiff was entitled to a refund of its fees). No mention was made in the Utah 
Restaurant Assoc, case regarding a requirement for a subsequent petition for a refund of 
the fees. 
Had Tooele Associate only asserted a claim for declaratory judgment then it would 
make sense to require it to file a separate follow-up petition for supplemental relief. But 
that is not the case here. Tooele Associates' fourth claim for relief requested a return of 
the portion of the Inspection Fee determined to be an illegal tax. Given the Trial Court's 
holding that the Civil Inspection Fee was an illegal tax, then Tooele Associates should be 
entitled to a return of its entire fee either under if fourth claim for relief or as 
supplemental relief to its declaratory judgment claim without having to file a subsequent 
petition. 
II. TOOELE ASSOCIATES SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY 
FEES UNDER THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE. 
A. Tooele Associates' Pecuniary Interest In The Outcome Should Not 
Prohibit An Award Of Tooele Associates' Attorney Fees. 
Tooele Associates' pecuniary interest in the determination of the illegality of the 
Civil Inspection Fee should not prohibit an award of Tooele Associates' attorney fees 
under the private attorney general doctrine. As set forth in Tooele Associates' Brief of 
Cross-Appellant, the element of "no pecuniary benefit to themselves" is not a required 
element but, rather, is one of three identified elements to be considered in determining 
whether a party is entitled to its attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. 
[Brief of Cross-Appellee at pp. 29-30]. However, as further pointed out in Tooele 
Associates' Brief, the court's inquiry is founded in equity and the "threshold issue is a 
rather transcendent, large picture question of public policy, namely, whether an important 
right affecting the public interest has been vindicated." Utahnsfor Better Dental Health-
Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Clerk 2007 UT 97, f 8, 175 P.3d 1036. 
The City's suggestion that a pecuniary interest acts as a complete bar to Tooele 
Associates' entitlement to its attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine is 
not supported by the Utah case law cited by the City. For example, in Stewart v. Utah 
Public Service Cornrn.. 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), the six plaintiffs, as ratepayers, had a 
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the lawsuit that challenged the Public Service 
Commission's rate increase. Id. at 762. The plaintiffs in Stewart were successful and as 
a result would benefit from lower rates and may in fact have received a refund of the 
unlawful fees, yet they were still awarded their attorney fees under the private attorney 
general doctrine. Id. at 783-84. 
It is obvious from a practical standpoint that, like in Stewart, it is often the 
plaintiffs pecuniary interest in the outcome that drives the suit, but that doesn't mean 
there is not an important public policy to be vindicated. Accordingly, the fact that 
Tooele Associates sought a pecuniary benefit for itself, should not prevent an award of its 
attorney fees where the lawsuit sought to vindicate an important public policy prohibition 
against illegal taxes. 
B. Tooele Associates' Lawsuit Is Extraordinary. 
Tooele Associates' lawsuit challenging the City's Civil Inspection Fee, which 
resulted in a determination that it was in fact an illegal tax, is extraordinary. As pointed 
out by the City, there are only a few reported cases in Utah that have been deemed to be 
extraordinary. However, at least two of the cases cited by the City, Stewart and Utahns 
for Better Dental Health, are not so different from this case. For example, in Utahns for 
Better Dental Health the plaintiffs, a group supporting water fluoridation, successfully 
challenged a petition seeking another vote on fluoridation on the grounds that it was an 
unconstitutional initiative petition. 2007 UT at ff 1-3. In reaching its decision, this Court 
relied on its previous statement that ~[b]ecause the people's right to directly legislative 
through initiative is sacrosanct and a fundamental right, Utah courts must defend it 
against encroachment and maintain it inviolate." Id. at f^lO (quoting Gallivan v. Walker, 
2002 UT 89, %21, 54 P.3d 1069. Similarly, it could be said that a citizen's, including a 
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corporate citizen's, right to be free from illegal taxes disguised as fees is a sacrosanct and 
fundamental right, which right was vindicated in this case. Tooele Associates' was not 
only vindicating its own rights, but it was also vindicating the rights of all future 
developers of property in Tooele. 
Accordingly, given the importance of the rights vindicated, this case should be 
deemed extraordinary. 
C. The Grant or Denial of Attorney Fees Under the Private Attorney 
General Doctrine Is Subject to De Novo Review. 
The City's assertion that the Trial Court's denial of attorney fees should be 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard is simply wrong. This Court in Utahns 
for Better Dental Health expressly stated that "the highly deferential standard of review 
utilized for other equitable awards of attorney fees is unsuitable for private attorney 
general doctrine cases and conclude instead that de novo review should be applied." 
2007 UT at THJ7-8. Accordingly, the Trial Court's denial of Tooele Associates' request 
for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine should be reviewed de novo. 
IIL THE TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON GIL MILLER'S REBUTTAL 
TESTIMONY DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF EXCESSIVE 
EXPERT FEES. 
Tooele Associates does not dispute that the Trial Court relied on Gil Miller's 
expert testimony with regard Ms. Richman's expert testimony. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that such testimony justifies the over 70 hours of work and almost 
$17,000 in expert costs incurred in preparing a four-page rebuttal report. It is evident 
from the quoted portions of the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision that the Trial Court 
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reliance related only to a couple of rebuttal points, none of which required substantial 
investigation. For example, the Trial Court concluded that Ms. Richmond's testimony 
regarding building material price changes over time was not reliable due to Mr. Miller's 
observation that Ms. Richmond's price comparison of building materials over time was 
not from a consistent supplier. [R. 00804, Memorandum Decision]. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Trial Court found Mr. Miller's rebuttal testimony 
useful does not automatically render any time and costs incurred in preparing the rebuttal 
report as reasonable. This argument is further complicated by the fact thai the 
determination of the reasonableness of expert fees was made by a different judge than the 
one that actually presided over the trial. [R. 00859-00858 Order Granting Expert Costs; 
R. 00855-00853 Minute Entry], 
Finally, Tooele Associates does not contend that Mr. Miller's use of lower level 
staff members to perform certain tasks was wrong. Rather, Tooele Associates simply 
points out that the number of different individuals working on what resulted in a four 
page rebuttal report is evidence that the almost $17,000 in expert costs was unreasonable. 
Accordingly, the Trial Court's award of expert costs should be reversed and/or 
reduced to a reasonable amount. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons set forth in Tooele Associates' Brief 
of Cross-Appelle, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's denial of Tooele Associates 
Fourth Cause of Action and re fond to Tooele Associates' Inspection Fee; reverse the 
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Trial Court's denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine; and 
reverse or reduce the Trial Court's award of $16,618.25 in expert costs. 
DATED this 30th day of November, 2009. 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
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Attorneys for Tooele Associates Limited 
Partnership 
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